More on Xu

(This was first written on the 7th of June).
It is difficult to tell if the removal of General Xu Caihou has overt political causes beyond the ongoing crackdown on corruption. Without evidence of Xu being obviously close to anyone in particular, we are left to guess as to where his removal sits in the broader picture of politics. It is also somewhat difficult to determine how Xu’s removal affects the ongoing course of the anti-corruption campaign, or the relationship of the Party with the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).
Those members of the political elite who are removed due to corruption tend to be weakened or political damaged already. Public scandal is also the necessary precondition for action to be taken. This was the case with Chen Xitong, Chen Liangyu, and Bo Xilai. This point about the necessary element of scandal may seem obvious: eruption of scandal leads to investigation, which leads to punishment and removal from power. Yet as obvious as it may seem, without this element of scandal, and without it being of a particularly disruptive effect, the ability to investigate, move past the obfuscation, and take down a senior figure is limited. When does a position become so untenable that leader abandons their protégé? Why does Gu Junshan face punishment, but not Ling Jihua (up to this point at least)? The answer can probably be found in the nature of the scandal, but also due to the nature and strength of the protection of a political mentor. Does it then follow that, as the so called “flies” begin to fall, that their patron will also fall as well, as his (always his) power has been disrupted and he cannot protect those around him? This hypothesis on the causal relationship between the fall of mentors and protégés will be proven correct if Zhou Yongkang eventually falls [he has since fallen from power].
But what of Xu? His own position was weakened considerably. Dying of cancer and confined to a hospital (apparently), Xu was unable (or unwilling) to exercise any interference in the investigation against him, or exercise any power at all. Incidentally, this has real implications for the perceived ability of Jiang Zemin to wield power behind the scenes from retirement. So Xu, effectively retired and out of action, is removed. No one currently serving in his position is touched. This does remove somewhat the impact of the charges against him. Of all the institutions of Party and state, the PLA is likely the most stubborn to reform and tackling corruption within. Xu’s removal may lead others to hide their behaviour better, but they will likely still act corruptly.
Yet the nature of the charges against Xu is interesting and informative. Rather than being charged with embezzlement or abuse of power, Xu was charged specifically with receiving bribes to facilitate promotions within the PLA. This practice is (from reports and my own firsthand information) all but ubiquitous in the PLA. Thus, charging Xu for receiving such bribes is a clear declaration that it is considered to be an unquestionably undesirable practice within the PLA which must come to an end. Time will tell if a serious officer of senior rank is removed for such a misdemeanour.
Of all institutions coming under the scrutiny of the current anti-corruption campaign, the PLA must require a certain degree of sensitivity on the behalf of the authorities. The PLA is the Party’s army, guaranteeing its security and position. Yet, in as much as this is the case, the Party is dependent upon the PLA. Disrupting it by taking out key leadership figures could serve to only destabilise the position of the PLA, and undermined the security of the Party. Party stability rests upon the PLA. Additionally, in the context of rising geo-political tensions, the Party finds itself in a delicate balance. Aggressively pursuing corruption will, in the short term, the operational efficacy of the force in pursuing geopolitical goals. Yet the PLA will never be an effective fighting force with its present levels of corruption. The optimal solution, ignoring any personal or political complications, is for the Party to move slowly. Therefore, we must wait. More senior figures may fall, but Xu’s removal may constitute the end of the PLA’s time to be investigated.
Some evidence suggests that attitudes to PLA corruption have finally taken some official effect. The people have always been outraged at the corruption and abuses of power within the PLA. This impact upon official attitudes has been articulated by a recent news story on the internet, of a traffic police officer in Nanjing stopping an army car breaking traffic laws. The driver tried to drive on, but the officer stood blocking the way of the car, preventing its departure. The driver (not in uniform) get out of the car to argue with the policeman, and was soon joined by the main passenger (also not in uniform) and a woman (his mistress). A mass search by netizens later identified the passenger (who need to be restrained from attacking the police officer) as a PLA officer and a member of the local people’s congress. His career is now, no doubt, over, while the police officer has been lavished with praise for his efforts. Since the beginning of this campaign, after the use of military number plates was restricted, people have enthusiastically joined in, taking photos of military cars in awkward places and putting those images online.
Beyond all of this, one figure looms, unnamed. General Liu Yuan is likely involved in all of this in some way. Liu is a great survivor- formally close to Bo Xilai as well as Xi Jinping. Liu has been a vocal opponent of corruption within the PLA, bringing to the fore discussions on corruption in the military. Whatever his role in the fall of Xu, it is likely that it was pivotal. His role ought to be further explored.
For now, we must be content with the fall of Xu, and await the fall of Zhou [we wait no longer]. Xu’s fall is not a clear story, and does not lead us to clear conclusions about the campaign against the presence and nature of PLA corruption. But the case of Xu is the fall of the most senior of the PLA since Lin Biao. That in itself is significant.